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Risk communication in emergency response to a
simulated extreme ﬂood
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Abstract
Risk communication in ﬂood incident management can be improved through developing hydrometeorological and engineering models
used as tools for communicating risk between scientists and emergency management professionals. A range of such models and tools was
evaluated by participating ﬂood emergency managers during a 4-day, real-time simulation of an extreme event in the Thamesmead area
in the Thames estuary close to London, England. Emergency managers have different communication needs and value new tools
differently, but the indications are that a range of new tools could be beneﬁcial in ﬂood incident management. Provided they are
communicated large model uncertainties are not necessarily unwelcome among ﬂood emergency managers. Even so they are cautious
about sharing the ownership of weather and ﬂood modelling uncertainties.
r 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
More than £200 billion worth of property and infra-
structure, and over 4 million people, are at risk from
ﬂooding around Britain’s rivers and coasts and in towns
and cities. Flooding in July 2007 demonstrated that when
water treatment plants, transportation and power systems
are adversely affected, the effects of ﬂooding can reach
almost the whole country. The risks of ﬂooding in Britain
are predicted to grow to unacceptable levels over the next
one hundred years. Annual average ﬂood damages are set
to rise signiﬁcantly (Ofﬁce of Science and Technology
2004). Increasing risks and ﬂood damage potential need to
be addressed across a broad front, including through new
ﬂood risk management strategies and reductions in global
emissions. Fresh ﬂood risk management strategies are
needed for improved catchment-wide and urban ﬂood
storage. There is a need for better land use management
and tighter ﬂoodplain planning controls (Howe and White,
2001; Pottier et al., 2005). Development which is located in
ﬂoodplains must be made more resistance and resilient.
River conveyance needs improving and the ﬂood defence
maintenance programme needs speeding up. The effective-
ness of ﬂood forecasts and warnings needs to be enhanced
(Parker, 2004) alongside more effective emergency plan-
ning and response during ﬂood incidents (Penning-Rowsell
and Wilson, 2006).
Providing a seamless emergency response to ﬂooding
was one of the key recommendations of the ‘Bye report’
(Independent Review Team, 1998) following the infamous
Easter 1998 ﬂoods in England and Wales. After these
ﬂoods, the ﬂood forecasting and warning service and the
emergency response were roundly criticised. Signiﬁcant
improvements are in train especially in ﬂood modelling and
forecasting, in the way in which ﬂood warnings are
organised and communicated, and in learning lessons from
recent ﬂoods. Even so effective ﬂood incident management
remains a major challenge. This was demonstrated by the
Cumbrian ﬂoods around Carlisle in 2005 (Government
Ofﬁce for the North West, 2005) during which power and
communications broke down, and also by the July 2007
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ﬂoods in the lower Severn valley in which the demountable
ﬂood defences for the town of Tewkesbury failed to arrive
in time because of ﬂooded and congested roads.
Flood incident management comprises preparedness for
ﬂoods; providing ﬂood information; communicating the
risks of ﬂooding to raise public awareness; detecting and
forecasting ﬂoods; communicating ﬂood warnings to the
public and to professional partners; promoting effective
warning response and responses to ﬂooding; effective
emergency exercises and planning; co-operation between
emergency services; media management and effective
aftercare (Fig. 1). In England and Wales the principal
professional actors involved in ﬂood incident management
are the Meteorological Ofﬁce, the Environment Agency,
local authorities, the police, the emergency services (e.g.
ﬁre, ambulance and voluntary services), and the media.
It is vital that communication tools optimise the risk
communication exchanges occurring at each professional
interface given the inevitable anxiety and stress of a time-
constrained emergency. This paper reports the results of an
exercise designed to investigate the value of meteorological,
hydrological and engineering models used as communica-
tion tools provided by scientists for professionals working
in the River Thames estuary in London. These profes-
sionals must make decisions about how to respond to ﬂood
warnings. The exercise also sought to identify the need for
improvements to ﬂood forecasting tools through the
trialling and assessment of their value to professional
stakeholders. International research on warning commu-
nications (e.g. Drabek, 1999, 2000; Emergency Manage-
ment Australia, 1999) has highlighted the issue of the use of
technical, non-transparent language in communications
between ﬂood forecasters and those responsible for issuing
ﬂood warnings both to the general public (e.g. Smith et al.,
1990; Hiroi, 1998, Parker, 2004) and to its professional
partners, such as the emergency response organisations
(Rosenthal and Bezuyen, 2000). Faulkner et al. (in press)
identify signiﬁcant translational discourse issues surround-
ing the risk communications between scientists and
professional users of ﬂood risk information, including in
the ﬂood warning arena. The Environment Agency has
recently established an agenda for research into incident
management (Environment Agency and DEFRA, 2006).
The agenda clearly identiﬁes communication across ‘ex-
ternal interfaces’ as a key component, although it does not
make explicit the need for ‘fuller’ translations of science
into dialogue and communications which might be avail-
able and appropriate to the professional recipients.
Scientiﬁc developments in modelling weather and ﬂood
futures
The development of meteorological, hydrological and
engineering tools and models has an important role in
improving risk communication during ‘real-time’ events.
A wide range of meteorological ‘futures’ models, ﬂood
routing simulations and physically-based rainfall-runoff
models is now available at a range of scales. Elsewhere, in
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Fig. 1. Outline of UK ﬂood incident management organisational activities and responsibilities.
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the coastal setting wave surge models are making the
‘pasting’ of wind-driven wave-surge models onto veriﬁable
tidal ﬂood surge models increasingly commonplace.
Forecasting an event at time T for a future at (T + dt) is
uncertain. Uncertainty of any risk assessment, whether
used for ﬂood warnings or ﬂoodplain inundation risk
maps, rests not only with the science but also with other
considerations, such as the scientist’s own technically-
informed judgments or predictions. Uncertainties about
both model structures as well as how they become
propagated (or ‘ramped’) has been the concern of several
recent papers (Bevan, 2005; Pappenburger et al., 2005). The
use of ‘ensembles’ as a way of mapping futures from the
updated Bayesian models used by the Meteorological
Ofﬁce has vastly increased the articulation of the un-
certainty of the predictions. In ensemble modelling, a
sample of possible model futures, starting from time T, is
mapped or articulated in graphical form for (T + dt). A
‘control’ simulation, which represents the best estimate of
the initial conditions after data assimilation at time T is
also run. The other members of the ensemble represent
perturbations of the control (and in the case of the weather
forecasts, this may also include different resolutions in the
numerical solution). A distribution of futures can be
produced from the ensemble set, and articulated visually
(as maps, for instance, or pressure ﬁeld distributions).
Weather ensembles, used in the workshop simulation
introduced below, are not associated with a probability,
but represent a range of expert-deﬁned possible futures – in
effect, an expert system. Although this suggests an
explosion of uncertainties in ‘futures’ modelling of this
kind, by iteratively assimilating new constraining data as
the event unfolds, the uncertainty does not necessarily
expand in such an uncontrolled way as it is ramped
through subsequent model runs or components. For
instance, Pappenberger et al. (2005) have proposed some
ways of dealing with the computational constraints of
evaluating the full range of uncertainties (and constraints
on uncertainties) in the European Flood Forecasting
System ﬂood forecasting project when discharge data are
available for data assimilation.
Ensemble modelling developments, and also hydrody-
namic modelling developments, lend themselves to poten-
tially visually and easily comprehensible representations. It
is possible that over time, risk communication will
increasingly embrace these new technologies. Additionally,
given effective translation, possibly by some intermediary
service, these possibilities may mean that ﬂood warning
and emergency response professionals making decisions in
constrained time situations can ‘own’ the more sophisti-
cated science of some of the new models and tools.
The Thames estuary workshop and exercise
A risk communication exercise was organised at the
Meteorological Ofﬁce in Exeter, England in March 2006 to
trial the sort of risk communication tools that are
available, or will soon be available, to managers and
professionals operating in ﬂood affected areas of the
Thames Estuary. The exercise was embedded in a 4-day
workshop organised under the auspices of the UK Food
Risk Management Research Consortium (FRMFC) which
aimed to help integrate work from a number of Research
Priority Areas (RPAs) contributing to the development of
ﬂood simulation tools (Table 1).
The Thames estuary and the Thamesmead embayment
The Thames Estuary is a unique navigational waterway
and an historic maritime gateway to London (Fig. 2). The
Estuary contains the Port of London and is a major focus
for industry, commerce, transport and recreation. The
Estuary and surrounding land is the setting for national
regeneration initiatives associated with the Thames Gate-
way developments, the London Olympics and offshore
wind farms. A high concentration of dwellings is planned:
around 120 dwellings per ha compared to a normal level of
around 30 dwellings per ha even in Southeast England
(Environment Agency Thames Estuary ‘TE2100’ project
Lavery and Donovan, 2005).
The principal ﬂood risk in the Thames estuary is
presented by tidal surges originating in the North Sea
(the Thames and its tributaries also generate ﬂuvial ﬂoods).
These surges travel up the estuary towards London. During
the 1980s the Thames tidal ﬂood exclusion barrier (termed
‘the Barrier’ below) was constructed to provide a 1:1000
year standard of tidal ﬂood protection. The Barrier has
ﬂood gates located on the bed of the river. When a tidal
event is forecast they are rotated and raised to hold tidal
ﬂoods at bay. The Barrier, and its associated sets of
downstream ﬂood embankments and walls and related
smaller moveable barriers (e.g. the Barking Barrier), must
therefore be operated on receipt of a ﬂood forecast and
warning. This is a vital part of ﬂood incident management
in the Estuary.
Thamesmead is a large riverside development in the
Thames Estuary (Fig. 2). It comprises high and low rise
residential blocks with interconnecting walkways and other
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Table 1
Research priority areas (RPA’s) in the Flood Risk Management Research
Consortium
Research priority area (RPA) Title of research area
RPA 1 Programme management
RPA 2 Land use management
RPA 3 Real-time forecasting
RPA 4 Infrastructure management
RPA 5 Whole systems modelling
RPA 6 Urban ﬂood management
RPA 7 Stakeholder and policy
RPA 8 Morphology and habitats
RPA 9 Risk and uncertainty
S. McCarthy et al. / Environmental Hazards ] (]]]]) ]]]–]]] 3
Please cite this article as: McCarthy, S., et al., Risk communication in emergency response to a simulated extreme ﬂood. Environmental Hazards
(2007), doi:10.1016/j.envhaz.2007.06.003
housing that covers 52.6 ha of former marshland the (Erith
Marshes). These are east and downstream of the Barrier.
Thamesmead was developed in the 1960s by the Greater
London Council. It was a long-term solution to London’s
post-war housing shortage. In order to build on the
marshland, ﬁve water storage lakes and a number of
channels for drainage were incorporated into the design for
the town. Also special investigations and techniques were
employed to ensure that the land could support the
construction, and to raise the properties above the danger
of ﬂooding until ﬂood walls along the Thames were raised.
Thamesmead is 5m below the Thames high-tide-deﬁned
ﬂoodplain, and being downstream of the Barrier its sole
protection are the substantial ﬂood embankments. How-
ever, under current global warming scenarios, all ﬂood
event recurrence probabilities are set to shift in an uncertain
way. Generally the standard of protection afforded by the
Barrier and ﬂood embankments is expected to markedly
decline. Embankment overtopping is set to become a serious
issue, and as a result four pumping stations are being
constructed. The simulated event described below focussed
on the entire section of the Thamesmead embayment shown
in Fig. 2 as the area within the box.
Structure of workshop and exercise
The workshop aimed to allow ﬂood modelling teams to
use and evaluate new forecasting tools in an unfamiliar
event in simulated real-time. Flows were simulated from
breach and/or overtopping sites into an inundation model
on a GIS base in real-time. The workshop highlighted the
sensitivity of the forecasts to the meteorological input using
ensembles. The embedded exercise, which is the focus of
this paper, investigated the value of models used as
communication tools for ﬂood incident management
professionals working in the Thamesmead area. It explored
relationships between forecasting, warning and emergency
response in the context of the issue of multiple threats;
and identiﬁed the need for improvements to the fore-
casting tools by trialling and assessing their value to
professionals managing ﬂood risks and emergency response
at Thamesmead.
The risk communication exercise focused particularly on
the relationship between ﬂood incident management
professionals and those scientists developing tools for
forecasting and event simulation. We hypothesised that a
fuller and broader exchange of information could enhance
the handling of the challenges situated between the
scientists making predictions and the professionals in-
volved in ﬂood incident management. A number of
interrelated issues was considered in the exercise. The ﬁrst
was how the different roles and responsibilities of the
professionals affected their communication needs as the
simulated event unfolded. Secondly, we focused on
the communication tools1 currently used by professionals,
and questioned whether they are optimised to the needs of
the particular communication or exchange. Whether or not
new communication tools might be helpful to professionals
in ﬂood incident management decision-making was ex-
plored. Thirdly, we explored where and how the scientiﬁc
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Fig. 2. Schematic indicating the location of the Thamesmead area.
1The term ‘tool’ is used here to mean the formulation of a future which
underpins a ‘ forecast’. This can be in the form of an alert, an event size
prediction, or a defence fragility analysis. It might also take the form of a
model output in graphical form, or as a map or a real-time visualisation in
cross-section or in plan. All these communication tools can include
formulations of the uncertainty embedded in that message.
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uncertainties are managed in the decision-making process;
and whether they are understood and articulated in the
decisions made by the professionals. The issue of owner-
ship is important here and so we considered who took
ownership of the challenge to deal with the uncertainty in
decision-making, including who took ownership of un-
certainties which may be disputed between scientist (i.e.
modellers) and professional (decision-makers).
Participating in the workshop were modellers from RPA
teams (Table 1). The RPA3 team had models of both
weather and tidal surge (the physically-based Mesoscale
Model 5 or MM5 similar to the Met Ofﬁce’s Proudman
Oceanographic Laboratory or POL model). These allow
the wind surge to be ‘pasted’ on top of the tidal surge. This
team was also responsible for the modelling and translation
of the combined wave dynamic up the Thames towards the
Barrier using a MIKE11 model (a widely used dynamic
river modelling tool). Representatives from RPA4 devel-
oped a fragility and infrastructural model for this wave and
tidal effect, concentrating on the Thamesmead embayment.
If development of the event allowed, it was proposed that a
breach simulated for a subset of ensembles would be used
by a modelling team from RPA5 to drive the inundation
model across the GIS landscape of the Thamesmead
embayment including its streets, parks and residential
areas. An essential new part of the available suite of tools
was to use ensembles as tools for uncertainty communica-
tion by the RPA4 and RPA5 teams. A team from within
RPA7 were then expected to test this approach of
combining different modelling techniques, in order to
assess the utility of differing sorts of tools, as well as their
embedded uncertainties. In the ﬁrst 2 days of the work-
shop, the modellers generated the predictions, maps and
information that they would produce at 3 days (T-72 h)
before and 1 day (T-24 h) before a ﬂood event. On the third
day they generated forecasts (a ‘nowcast’) from 6h prior to
the occurrence of an event.
For the input to the surge forecasts, the new experi-
mental Meteorological Ofﬁce ensemble prediction system
was used (Table 2: tools in categories A and B). Real
ensemble forecasts were carried out after an event, using
archive data, and incorporated into the simulated work-
shop event as if it were occurring in real-time (tool A5).
The surge forecasts are referred to here as ‘tools in
category C’. In order to simulate the largest possible event,
and therefore to test the embankment defence models
and tools in category E, the time of the run of the surge
model D was adjusted so as to obtain a surge peak as close
as possible to high tide. The wave forecasts (Table 2:
tools A4 and A5) were those archived at the time of
the real event. The simultaneous rainfall forecasts (Table 2:
tool B) were obtained using real forecasts, archived at the
time of the rainfall event, but moved in real-time to
match the high tide. The 1-day and 3-day ensembles were
simulated using the capabilities of the STEPSTM forecast-
ing system (Pierce et al., 2004) with estimated uncertainty
ranges.
The simulated event
In the simulated event in the Thames estuary, the highest
tide for 25 years is simulated to occur at 2pm on Thursday
30 March—thus giving a known time for the pre-event
sequence to commence. The data are from two real events
in 2005: the tidal surge event occurred in November 2005,
and the heavy rain event occurred in June 2005 (GLC,
1967; Wigfall, 1997). Artiﬁciality was introduced as the
modellers arranged for the modest tidal surge event to
synchronise with an extreme tide, and the group of
meteorologists translated a heavy rainfall event from NE
France to London. An additional artiﬁciality was that the
two events are assumed to occur together.
During the workshop it was discovered that at T-72 the
simulations suggested that the selected event (which was
based on the highest known events) was insufﬁciently high
to test the ﬂood embankments. The group discussed
whether this was likely to be a true representation of such
a compound event, and the possibility that the smaller than
expected event was an artefact of the surge prediction up
the Thames, or a suppressed peak by the software used. In
the circumstances, a decision was made to proceed with an
event more likely to test the range of models present.
Therefore a factor of 4 was added to the surge and the
model was re-run on T-24.2
The simulation of the extreme event was in several
stages. (Fig. 3) In the initial stage, predominantly,
meteorological models were utilised. In the second stage
meteorological tools were updated using ensemble models
over varying timescales. In the third stage, the wave
produced by the North Sea storms event which had been
generated by the meteorological models, was ramped on to
the high tide predictions to give the Sheerness (Fig. 2) water
level predictions that run the hydrodynamic model Mike 11
up towards the Barrier. Output from this model allowed
the possibility of a breach and/or overtopping of defences
to be explored. In the fourth and ﬁnal stage, 6 h before the
anticipated high tide, the real-time inundation of Thames-
mead was simulated from the weakest breach location
using a two-dimensional ﬂood inundation model (Table 2).
Unfortunately, given the artiﬁcial computing constraints
at the workshop and the lack of on-line data assimilation
for constraining uncertainties during this simulation,
uncertainty was not directly addressed by most of the
modellers, except in the meteorological models where
ensembles were available. Thus it is important to differ-
entiate between what might be possible in real operational
forecasting, and the uncertainty work of the simulation
exercise.
The risk communication exercise
The focus of the risk communication exercise was the
risk communication potential of the interface activities in
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2This is therefore an unrealistic scenario within the lifetime of the
existing ﬂood protection systems, which was a considerable relief to the
stakeholders present.
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simulated real-time between the group of meteorological
experts, the group of hydraulic engineers, and the group of
inundation modellers and their research teams; and a
group of ﬂood warning and emergency response profes-
sionals working in the area of Thamesmead, London. Four
participants (referred to as ‘professionals’) were invited to
participate. They were an emergency planning ofﬁcer for
one of the London Boroughs covering Thamesmead, a
Metropolitan Police Inspector in a group responsible for
emergency procedures and planning in the Metropolitan
Police, a senior ﬂood risk manager (the Barrier manager)
and a ﬂood incident manager both from the Environment
Agency (the ﬂood management agency for England) with
responsibilities for the Barrier and for ﬂood warnings
affecting Thamesmead, respectively. This group attended
the last 2 days of the 4-day workshop. For practical
reasons, in this exploratory research, the number of
professionals invited was limited, but this small group
included representatives of the main agents responsible for
acting in ﬂood events (Fig. 1). The simulation provided
decision-makers with a long lead time into a possible ﬂood.
However, it quickly became clear that professional reaction
to forecast information was constrained by organisational
responsibilities and abilities. With a simulated sudden
breach of defences the focus of professionals was therefore
on reﬁnement of decisions set in pre-planning exercises.
On the ﬁrst day the four professionals participated in a
wide ranging, tape-recorded discussion of their roles and
responsibilities in ﬂood incident management. They identi-
ﬁed the types of risk communication tools currently used.
Risk communication researchers then developed a time line
and Power Point presentation to show the outputs, tools
and predictions emerging from the modelling processes
covering 72 h, 24 h and ﬁnally six hours prior to the
simulated ﬂood event. The nature of several of the tools
that were new to the professional participants, e.g. the
ensemble modelling, was ‘translated’ for them as the
exercise unfolded. Then, the professionals were invited to
report on their experience of the tools and the translation
provided, and to evaluate the utility of the new tools and
models within their professional setting. On the second
day, an overview of all the outputs from the modelling was
presented to a plenary session involving all those attending
the workshop and exercise with opportunities for ques-
tions, explanations and elaborations by the scientists
responsible for the modelling. Three of the professionals
then gave tape-recorded presentations summarising their
reactions and response to the materials generated by the
ARTICLE IN PRESS
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Fig. 3. Information ﬂow and model use during the Exeter workshop.
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modellers. A week after the exercise, the professionals were
sent copies of the materials listed in Table 2, which with the
modelling tools that were developed at the workshop,
includes the explanatory descriptions to translate the sense
of the models from scientist to professionals. After given
time to contemplate away from the workshop, the
professionals were asked to complete a structured self-
completion postal questionnaire. This included questions
on whether and how the materials might be useful to the
professionals, and also on the clarity, detail and presenta-
tion of uncertainty associated with them.
Results
Current professional roles, responsibilities and
communication needs
The professionals reported their existing roles and
responsibilities, their current practice in ﬂood risk com-
munication during extreme events, and the tools that are
available to them.
The Environment Agency professionals
The role of the Barrier manager is central to risk
communication and emergency response in the Thames
Estuary area. The Environment Agency professionals from
the Barrier reported that the Meteorological Ofﬁce ‘alert’
of an extreme event is a key part of Barrier management.
Agency professionals understand that the alert is the
outcome of a complex Meteorological Ofﬁce modelling
process, professionally interpreted on site, but issued in a
shorthand form. The alert is designed to assist the complex
decision-making process at the Barrier, including whether
or not to close the Barrier and associated defences, and
when to close them. Currently, the alert takes the form of
three key pieces of data: (1) the estimated water level at a
telemetry point; (2) a conﬁdence statement about the
model, e.g. ‘moderate’; and (3) any error factor added by
the Meteorological Ofﬁce to the model prediction. To-
gether with the level of certainty associated with the
prediction, the additional error information (3 above) is
crucial for the Agency professionals at the Barrier. This is
because it avoids Barrier operators compounding the error
with their own estimates of wider decision uncertainty.
Once the alert is issued, assuming that a ﬂood is being
generated in the North Sea, Barrier managers also have
access to their own science in the form of actual river and
sea telemetry, the Agency’s North Sea model, and the
Meteorological Ofﬁce’s CS3 model.3 The Meteorological
Ofﬁce also provides both routine predictions of cyclical
high tides and unusual rainfall events.
It is clear therefore, that the outputs of scientiﬁc
modelling already inform decisions at the Barrier. How-
ever, all of the participating professionals stressed that
decisions are not made on the basis of a single source of
information, or in isolation. Depending upon the level of
uncertainty in the information (the Barrier professionals
described this as ‘‘ythe degree of residual data in the
Barrier models predictions’’), and also on the seriousness of
the consequences associated with an event, a discussion
would occur set around the data available to the Agency
and the Meteorological Ofﬁce. The Barrier duty ofﬁcer is
expected to discuss the data directly with colleagues at the
Barrier, and by telephone with the Meteorological Ofﬁce.
Observation and interrogation of the modelling outputs
would continue. If technical issues arise with the models,
specialist consultants would also be brought into the
discussion. This discussion would draw upon any addi-
tional data sources, together with the experience and the
knowledge of those involved. Although a discussion is
undertaken between the professionals, the ﬁnal decision as
to whether action is to be taken, and the form it takes lies
with the duty ofﬁcer at the Barrier. It was reported that a
decision to engage the ﬂood defences is taken in the context
of the wider ﬁnancial, social and environmental conse-
quences. As well as risk to life issues, there are the ﬁnancial
costs to businesses associated with disruption to shipping
on the Thames, and to road trafﬁc with the closure of roads
by engaging the surrounding movable defences. The
Barrier manager has to weigh the social, economic and
environmental consequences of ﬂood inundation, as these
‘‘youtweigh those of operating the defences’’, including, it
seems, operations that turn out to have been inappropriate.
The way this was expressed was that there were ‘‘yno
prizes for not taking action when action was required’’.
The local authority emergency management and the
Metropolitan Police participants
Emergency management decisions, both strategic and
tactical, were reported by the local authority and police
service professionals to require a balance between the
humanitarian issues and issues concerning the limited
organisational resources at their disposal and the wider
ﬁnancial consequences of decisions. Each stated that for
their organisations, the protection of life was a primary
concern, and that scientiﬁc data inputs played a role, but
were not a central professional concern. Management
decisions revolved around availability of staff and material
resources and the need to ensure the safety of staff and the
public. Concerning Thamesmead, decisions would need to
be made about which residents to move ﬁrst. Given that the
local authorities might have to evacuate up to 80,000
people, which is infeasible in a 24 h period, the minimum
early warning lead time required can be deﬁned, although
conﬁdence in a warning with such a lead time is an issue.
The timing of release of a warning by the Environment
Agency is not only dependent upon the Agency’s con-
ﬁdence in the data underlying a decision to release a
warning. It is also based upon the need for clarity by the
recipients. The Agency professionals stated that the
decision to release a warning can be viewed as a wider
ARTICLE IN PRESS
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tactical decision, and should be timed, in part, ‘‘y so as
not to confuse recipients’’. For example, a formal warning
related to, say, an unusual tide may be ‘held’ until 12 h
before the event. This is so that recipients of the message
are not confused about which tide the warning is
associated. However, decisions may be made to provide
certain recipients with an earlier warning where it is
required for effective action such as evacuation.
Non-coincident communication needs
This discussion above makes it clear that throughout a
ﬂood event, such as the simulated or real event, each of the
professional organisations have different responsibilities,
different associated capabilities, and different timelines for
action. These are not necessarily coincident. The Agency
professionals at the Barrier are on alert and communicat-
ing with the Meteorological Ofﬁce and their own scientists
from an early stage. By contrast, the particular local focus
of the local authority emergency management and police
services professionals means that their roles are mainly
acted out later in the event and are focussed on potentially
affected locations. Thus, the differing temporal and spatial
focus of each professional’s responsibilities substantially
affects their need for communication and the nature of the
tools that are likely to be most effective for them.
Response to new ﬂood risk communication tools
The professional’s reactions to the various tools trialled
at the workshop are discussed below. The translational
descriptions in Table 2 were used to assist the professionals
to understand more clearly the model outputs as tools.
Feedback from the Environment Agency professionals
During the exercise it became clear that a number of the
communication tools listed in Table 2 were already in use
by the Meteorological Ofﬁce and in the Environment
Agency. For the Agency professionals, climate forecasting
using the climatic pressure and wind maps (tools A and
Fig. 4) and rainfall models (tools B) are commonly
available, in the sense that the Meteorological Ofﬁce Storm
Tide Forecasting Service (Meteorological Ofﬁce STFS) is
informed by these tools in order to decide if they should
release an alert of an unusual climatic event to the Agency.
One and two-dimensional hydrodynamic models (tools D1
and F—see Figs. 5–7) are also available for inundation
forecasting in the Agency. The Agency professionals
reported that the potential usefulness of these tools had
already been illustrated during a threatened ﬂood incident
above the Barking Barrier (Fig. 2). The representation of
the possible inundation not only helped in emergency
planning, but also in effective communication to other
professional stakeholders, including the media.
The Agency professionals reported that they would not
currently be exposed to the ensemble predictions surround-
ing the tools (A and B) that inform the ﬁnal decision of
the Meteorological Ofﬁce Storm Tide Warning System
(STWS). While the decision to operate the Barrier was
viewed as a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ decision by the Agency
professionals operating the Barrier, they were enthusiastic
about embracing some of the uncertainty in the form of
ensembles (Fig. 4). Both Agency professionals were eager
to discuss how this interface with ensemble modellers might
work in practice. The Barrier manager explained: ‘‘yit
would be extremely useful to receive ensemble forecasts to
assist operational discussion. y if they (the team) had
ensemble forecasts they could have a one-to-one conversation
with STWS’’.
In the context of discursive decision-making, it was
suggested that the ensembles would need to be available to
all parties involved in the discussion at the time (e.g. an
interactive conference call was suggested, with the en-
sembles being available online for both scientist and
professional). However, the professionals believed that
access to such tools would only be required when decisions
were being discussed, rather than tools being available to
alert them to events on a daily basis. This is illustrated by
the following comment:‘‘ythere is no point in sending those
ensembles through for 365 days a year, because what will
happen is they’ll get missed, because we’re all human’’.
Feedback on tools from local authority emergency manager
and the police representative
All trialled tools were new to the local authority and
police professionals. They commented that they were
currently dependent upon the ‘experts’ (i.e. from the
Meteorological Ofﬁce and Environment Agency) for the
interpretation of the pressure and wind data, and any
associated ensembles (tools A and Fig. 4). The weather-
based models (tools A and B) and the North Sea surge
models (tools C) were of less interest, and viewed as less
relevant to their decision-making and response. The police
professional considered that the level of detail in the form
of scale of tools in categories A and B2 was insufﬁcient to
make his organisation’s decisions. However, the local
authority professional commented that the rainfall maps
(tool B2) could be helpful in discussion of an unfolding
event with experts. This interest mainly focused on local
authority forward planning and the staff resources required
for effective response to an event.
While the surge models (tools C and D and Fig. 5) are
not used currently to inform decisions made by the local
authority and police professionals, they were considered
potentially useful for internal communication of the risk.
Working at a ﬁner spatial resolution, that of individual
streets, these professionals considered that the defence
fragility analyses, breach location predictions and the
inundation models (tools E and F, and Figs. 6 and 7),
could have greater potential in decision-making about
evacuation of people and deployment of resources.
Inundation simulations, in particular, could be used to
identify ‘hotspots’ for ﬂuvial and urban ﬂooding, other
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Fig. 5. Tool D1: Enhanced surge ‘control’, (high tide plus wind surge from C2), shown in cross-section up to the Thamesmead embankments (a realtime
representation using MIKE11TM).
Fig. 4. Tool A5: weather predictions made72 h before predicted high tide: the ‘control’ wind map, alongside 23 ensemble members for the time interval
covering the predicted high tide. (Original shaded in colour range from green to red). (c) Crown Copyright.
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than those already known to the authorities. The local
authority professional also considered that the fragility
analyses (tool E1) could be useful in decisions regarding
evacuation, but for the police service representative their
use was limited without further data from the Agency. This
latter sentiment was shared by the Agency professional,
who stressed that additional information was required in
interpretation and release of fragility analyses to Agency
professional partners.
For the emergency services, the inundation models
(tools F) could help to decide where the police should
erect cordons, and also where the ﬁre service should site its
large water pumps. This is particularly important for large
pumps which, once placed in position, are difﬁcult to move
quickly out of harms way. For the local authority
professional, the inundation model was perceived as a
technical tool which could assist strategic planning. In
combination with the more detailed information, the
inundation models (tool F3, Fig. 6), were considered very
useful for evacuation decisions.
The outputs of ﬂood velocity and depth models (tool F4,
Fig. 7) were considered to be potentially useful in
informing assessments and decisions about risk, not only
to the public, but also to emergency service staff. For local
authorities, key issues concern if and when residents need
evacuating, to which locations and by what methods. The
depth/velocity plots could help in these decisions which
might, for example, include decisions about if and how
long residents could remain in tower blocks as areas of
refuge from ﬂood water.
Both the local authority and police professionals would
like more data indicating when ﬂooding would recede, and
whether or not there is any likelihood of immediate further
ﬂooding. Such information would inform the start of
recovery activities which involves decisions about the safely
of sending staff back into a ﬂooded area. The models
available in the exercise did not directly address these issues.
Ownership of uncertainty
The possibility of an enhanced ownership of a more
detailed articulation of the scientiﬁc uncertainties was
discussed with the group of professionals. It was apparent
that for tools currently in use the sharing of uncertainty
between different professional roles was grounded in
current knowledge and experience of model operating
uncertainty and mainly took place in the form of a formal
statement in warnings and during decision discussions. It is
during discussions that uncertainty can surface and the
issue of ownership may be heightened. However, it was
apparent that currently ownership is not disputed due to
the clear demarcation of who makes the ﬁnal decision and
informal appreciation of who in the discussion has the
competency to judge the uncertainty.
In the case of new tools such as the ensembles (e.g., Fig. 5),
once explained, the professionals were comfortable with this
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Fig. 6. Tool F3: Computer simulation of inundation of the Thamesmead embayment onto an OS map, using data available from tools E and D4, 24 h
ahead of anticipated high tide. Real-time simulation using LiDAR DEM of the embayment, using a two-dimensional hydrodynamic model.
Fig. 7. Tool F4: Depth and velocity plots for any selected point within the
Thamesmead embayment. These graphs can be shown alongside depth/
velocity plan real-time simulations in plan.
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new articulation of uncertainty. However, the ensembles
were not considered to be tools which the professionals could
own and manipulate themselves. A comment directed at the
scientists by the emergency management professional was
‘‘So basically we can handle the uncertainty, we’re at ease with
that, we can handle the ensembles but even at best we probably
can’t out do you on that score’’. The local authority and police
professionals only cautiously accepted the possibility of an
enhanced ownership of a more detailed articulation of the
uncertainties in the science. Concern was expressed that
responsibility for interpretation of (i.e. handling the un-
certainties in) all the tools should remain where the expertise
lies, and should not overburden other’s decision-making
responsibilities. While reluctant to embrace professional
ownership of the embedded uncertainty of these models,
nevertheless there were several comments about e.g. ‘‘y is it
accurate?’’, because this would be crucial in planning
evacuations and deployments generally.
Additional emerging issues
The professionals participating in the workshop and
exercise raised a number of views about the trialled
communication tools which were additional to the main
focus of the exercise.
Improved decision making and anxiety reduction
Clearly, scientiﬁc modelling outputs can inform timely
emergency decision-making. However, the professionals
also believed that ‘science’ can also improve the environ-
ment in which decision-making take place. For example,
the local authority professional stated that ‘‘the intelli-
gence-led approach is again hugely important, because it
enables the decision-makers and the decision-making process
to become far more effective and would reduce the panic that
will inevitably start to generate both within the public but
also the organisation’’. This demonstrates a belief that
scientiﬁc, evidence-based information can improve deci-
sion-making about, e.g., engaging mobile ﬂood defences,
and/or evacuating people from a ﬂooded area; and that this
in turn is likely to give the public greater conﬁdence
thereby reducing their anxiety during an event.
Motivational communication tools
The local authority and police professionals reported
that their decisions are based upon interpretation by the
experts of ‘‘y what won’t, may and will happen’’. Forward
planning and action in local authority and police depart-
ments is dependent upon superiors, and stakeholders such
as utility companies, being motivated to take appropriate
levels of action in response to an impending ﬂood event.
The professionals felt that trialled communication tools
could help to persuasively communicate to sceptical
audiences the possibility and serious consequences of a
ﬂood event. Both the local authority and police profes-
sionals believed that vivid representations, and in parti-
cular the animated surge models (tools C1 and D1, Fig. 5)
are ‘‘the sort of thing that’s going to make people sit up and
really take notice’’.
At the exercise it became clear that the professionals
already had a working relationship, either through their
responsibilities for the Thamesmead area, or through the
collaborative, partnership activities required by the Civil
Contingencies Act 2004. The scientiﬁc tools trialled during
the exercise would be required to operate within the
context of these relationships, and of the tools already
employed. The police professional commented: ‘‘y I work
quite closely with XXX (Environment Agency professional)
and if XXX blinks his eyes that tells me everything I need to
know y that is a refinement of lots and lots of trust and
communication’’ y Where such working relationships do
not exist to the same extent as between the professionals
participating in the exercise, the requirements for clarity
and the motivational power of the tools to inform becomes
more important. This is so for the stakeholders which the
professionals have to inform in an emergency, but is to
some extent equally an issue for all professionals. This is
because the kind of event simulated in the workshop would
be very unusual for both the professionals and their
organisations.
The meaning of accuracy of information to the participating
professionals
The local authority and police professionals commented
that they were dependent upon the accuracy of the
Environment Agency’s ﬂood warnings. For all three
organisations, timely receipt of information was viewed
as crucial, but ‘accuracy of information’ was also of
considerable concern. For the Barrier professionals, the
level of ‘accuracy’ required was the margin of error needed
in making decisions to avert major ﬂooding. In the case of
the simulated event, the Barrier manager explained that his
margin of error was ‘‘y the height of the Barrier and related
defences, but as an everyday concern this takes the form of
the free-board4 on the City side of the Barriery’’ and that
‘‘yworking above this margin of error would be difficult to
translate into useful information for decisions’’. This
demonstrates that the operational view of ‘accuracy’ and
‘margin of error’ are currently conceptualised very
differently from the scientists’ view of model outcomes
and uncertainties.
The accuracy of the inundation models, and their ability
to deliver detailed information, was also discussed. With
their need to make tactical decisions on the ground, the
professionals felt that the greater the local detail (e.g. the
locations of large pumps) the better. Of some concern was
the local authority professional’s view that the ﬁner detail
ARTICLE IN PRESS
4Free-board is the distance between normal water level and the top of
river Thames embanked ﬂood defences. According to the Environment
Agency professional this free-board is 45 cm.
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implicit in the two-dimensional hydrodynamic inundation
models, the greater is the certainty in the predictions
suggesting some higher level of ‘accuracy’ or even
‘certainty’. However, if the two-dimensional model is the
ﬁnal output from a complex modelling cascade as trialled
at the workshop, inevitably the inundation model is almost
entirely dependent on the effectiveness of the models that
precede it. This means that the degree of conﬁdence of this
apparent detail needs further unpicking to be useful to
these professionals. It is clear that the effectiveness of
organisations in making strategic and tactical decisions
depends to some extent upon the levels of uncertainty
associated with the scientiﬁc information. If it is to be
enhanced ownership of uncertainty must be based upon an
improved understanding of the complexity of the science.
All parties agreed that they would ﬁnd uncertainty
estimation useful, and that they enjoyed working with the
new technologies.
Conclusion
Enhanced inclusion of scientiﬁc formulations in the
exchanges between the scientists, such as meteorological
scientists and ﬂood modellers, and those professionals
responsible for managing ﬂood risks, ﬂood defences and
the emergency response to ﬂooding is now increasingly
possible. Not only is the science of weather and ﬂood
prediction advancing, but the science and technology of
communications is rapidly developing and expanding. The
policy context is also changing with more effective ﬂood
incident management being demanded by politicians, the
media and the public. This is all occurring during an era in
which the possibility of climate-change-induced ﬂooding
and greater ﬂood impacts are of considerable concern.
There is a clearly deﬁned requirement for risk commu-
nicators in real-time situations to be undertaking effective
communication in extreme situations like the simulated
event. Equally professionals often demand that ﬂood
warnings be clear, unambiguous and as speciﬁc as possible,
and appropriate to the recipients in language and content.
Currently, however, even between scientists and profes-
sionals, a simple three or four-point risk warning, or ‘alert’
(e.g. ‘high, medium or low ﬂood risk’), is often issued in
one-way mode only (by fax is currently common practice).
A note in relation to the scientists’ conﬁdence in the
certainty of that communication is usually included as a
one-line comment. Yet even with the note of caution about
prediction conﬁdence, the clarity and brevity of an ‘alert’
may inadvertently transfer an impression of ‘accuracy’
which it cannot contain. O’Neill (2004) has argued that
from the point of view of the scientist charged with
modelling events as they unfold and issuing warnings,
emergency incidents can be envisioned to occupy an
uncertainty envelope, the size of which reduces as the
onset of the event approaches, and the choices become
clearer. Scientists are aware that model uncertainties can
become ‘ramped’ in possibly complicated ways. Pappen-
burger et al. (2005) refer to this effect as a ‘cascading’
rather than a ‘ramping’ of uncertainties.
In situations such as the defended tidal section of the
Thames estuary, where the possibilities include sudden
onset of breaches in ﬂood defences, it is clear that these
events have some ‘lead time’ within which the uncertainty
of the breach can be evaluated and the options for
emergency response assessed. Nevertheless, until the full
articulation of scientiﬁc uncertainty is possible, in situa-
tions when models are assembled in sequence as attempted
in the exercise reported here, the inundation model still
possesses the power to mislead with the level of apparent
predictive capacity it holds. In the case where full
articulation of scientiﬁc uncertainty was to be implemen-
ted, a very important component would have to be
visualisation of uncertain forecasts at each stage of
modelling. More importantly, continual updating of
predictions by on-line observations would need to be
available to constrain the uncertainties (as in Pappenburger
et al., 2005). The full trialling of uncertainty in commu-
nications must therefore wait for development of these
models. In this latter respect, we observed that there is
currently a stretch between the concept of uncertain
science, and the requirement for accuracy reported by the
participating professionals. Some translation of language
and concepts in this area could be beneﬁcial.
The risk communication exercise demonstrated that
greater involvement with models trialled as decision-
support tools at earlier stages, as well as improved
ownership of prediction in the pre-event period, could be
beneﬁcial for ﬂood risk managers including the emergency
management professionals. The research indicates that the
wider use of a range of new models as communication tools
is likely to be valuable. The roles and responsibilities of
professionals mean that they have different data commu-
nication needs: they therefore value the trialled models
differently as communication tools. The Environment
Agency professionals were enthusiastic about embracing
uncertainty in the form of ensembles, but only during an
emerging ﬂood event. The surge models, rather than the
weather-based models, were considered to be potentially
useful by the local authority and police professionals, but
are not currently used by them. Defence fragility analyses,
breach location predictions and inundation models were
considered to have potential in emergency management
decision-making. Similarly, the ﬂood velocity and depth
models would be informative in the same context. In some
cases, however, data which emergency managers require
are not currently available, and this indicates other models
which might be produced in future (e.g. a ﬂoodwater
recession model).
It is not possible to draw ﬁrm conclusions that will
inform policy from engagement of such a small group of
professionals, and from a simulation focused on a single
special extreme event. Less experienced ﬂood warning duty
ofﬁcers and those monitoring multiple ﬂood events
developing in a number of river catchments might have
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different views on the utility of new communication tools
such as ‘ensembles’. Nevertheless, our investigation chal-
lenges the idea that a large amount of model uncertainty is
unwelcome for managers. This paper, therefore, makes a
contribution to stimulating the debate about the type and
level of new tools to be deployed in ﬂood forecasting,
warning and response systems. Viewing certain model
outputs as communication tools raises issues of ownership
and clarity of uncertainties. Professional participants were
cautious about owning or sharing the ownership of model
uncertainty. In our view, shared ownership of uncertainty
does not negate clear decision pathways or ownership of
decisions. Further research is required on these issues, and
into the ‘translation’ or explanation required if such
scientiﬁc outputs are to be communicated.
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